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Spinoza’s attitude toward nonhuman animals is uncharacteristically cruel. 
This essay elaborates upon this ostensible idiosyncrasy in reference to 
Hasana Sharp’s commendable desire to revitalize a basis for animal ethics 
from within the bounds of his system. Despite our favoring an ethics 
beginning from animal affect, this essay argues that an animal ethic adequate 
to the demands of our historical moment cannot be developed from within 
the confines of strict adherence to Spinoza’s system—and this is not yet to 
speak of a more robust animal ethics which would advocate actual care and 
compassion for the animals themselves. We argue that on the assumption of 
Spinoza’s ontological biocentrism, in the presence of Spinozist determinism 
and the absence of an axiological biocentrism, an anthropocentric axiology 
necessarily follows. Any Spinozist animal ethic must fall back, therefore, 
upon appeals to the maximization of human pleasure and power; hence 
Spinoza’s ruthless injunction to “use (the animals) at our pleasure.” These 
are the very ontological and ethical assumptions which have incited human 
self-exaltation in the modern period, in pursuit of power and pleasure even 
despite the destructive long-term consequences for all the living. We suggest 
that an adequate animal ethic would require either an abandonment of 
Spinoza’s ontological biocentrism or the adoption of an axiological 
biocentrism.  
 












Spinoza’s Ethics presents a vision of reality that has inspired 
environmental thinkers for the past four decades and beyond. Reasons for 
this are clear: the ontological biocentrism laid out in this work would appear 
to undermine human arrogance and give grounds for reconceptualizing the 
human as one humbled part of a larger whole, a conception by all 
appearances conducive to fostering respect or concern for nature. When it 
comes to Spinoza’s own understanding of his system’s implications 
regarding human relations to the rest of nature, however, we find aversion to 
the some of the ethical conclusions environmentalists might expect. Far from 
encouraging care or concern for animals of other species, for example, 
whether of the holist or individualist variety, he doubles down on the human 
right to dominion—even writing of the pleasure he obtains in forcing spiders 
to fight one another to the death, and of attaching flies to spiderwebs in order 
to watch them struggle for their lives.  
 Spinoza clutches to hold onto the traditional distinction between 
human and animal by appealing to a specifically human “essence” or 
“nature,” despite the fact that by his own definitions these terms fail to 
designate anything specific about the human animal. In the Scholium to 
IIIP57 he writes, “Hence it follows that the emotions of animals that are 
called irrational…differ from the emotions of men as much as their nature 
differs from human nature.” But later in the same note he indicates that the 
difference in nature between a drunkard and a philosopher might just be 
greater than the difference in nature between a lusting horse and a lusting 
human. The insinuation is clearly that when human beings fail to live up to 
their capacity to reason, they make themselves lower than the animals. At 
one point in the Ethics Spinoza goes so far as to interpret the biblical story of 
the Fall as an allegory for the first man’s imitation of animal affects, the very 
source of human “evil,” to be avoided at all costs. 
 Just as deep ecologists of previous generations, notably George 
Sessions and Bill Devall, following Arne Naess, looked to Spinoza’s Ethics 
for an ontological vision to ground a new environmental ethic, so too 
posthumanists of more recent years have pushed to extend Spinoza’s 
biocentric outlook into the realm of animal ethics. Hasana Sharp is one such 
advocate, an impressive Spinoza scholar and an exponent of posthumanist 
ethics and politics, to be extended to humans and nonhumans alike (Sharp 
2009 and 2011; Sharp and Willett 2016). While acknowledging that Spinoza 






cruelty to nonhuman animals, Sharp joins Arthur Schopenhauer and others 
in suggesting that this lapse in character breaks with the tenor of his system, 
or with what it would seem to demand (cf. e.g. Berman, 1982, p. 203). 
Accepting Spinoza’s premises, she argues on behalf of an animal ethic that 
appeals to pleasure or joy received from an exchange of animal affects, across 
species. Such is assumed to be more consistent with Spinoza’s ontology, and 
Sharp suggests that posthumanist thinkers like Gilles Deleuze and Donna 
Haraway have already made great strides in this direction (Sharp, 2011, p. 
64). 
Under the conditions assumed, we maintain, such an animal “ethic” 
could not be properly called ethical. In the field of environmental ethics, this 
was essentially Attfield’s response, albeit brief, to Spitler (Attfield, 1987, pp. 
48-49; Spitler, 1982).  Our thesis is that an adequate animal ethic would 
require either breaking with, or at least substantially modifying Spinoza’s 
biocentric ontology, in order to undermine the axiological anthropocentrism 
it entails; or adopting a biocentric axiology and thereby attributing intrinsic 
value to nonhuman animals, along with the many other modes of Being. 
Having mentioned Spinoza’s “biocentric outlook,” we must clarify 
our uses of the term biocentric. First, we note that Devall and Sessions went 
beyond Spinoza in their attribution of intrinsic value to all life. On its own 
terms Spinoza’s philosophical system implies only that humans and other 
modes of being are to be afforded equal ontological status—not equal 
axiological status. Far from attributing intrinsic value, as anecdotes 
concerning animal cruelty would indicate, Spinoza assumes that merely 
instrumental value accrues to creatures not of our species. This is the 
axiological position typically identified as anthropocentric. We begin, 
therefore, by distinguishing between what we’ll label ontological 
biocentrism and axiological biocentrism. Ontological biocentrism would be 
the position which holds that all modes of being stand on equal ontological 
footing, as expressions or modifications of Being. By contrast, axiological 
biocentrism would be the value-positing standpoint which attributes inherent 
worth to all living beings. The Spinozist viewpoint we address affirms 
Spinoza’s ontological biocentrism while joining him in the rejection of 
axiological biocentrism. Hence the title of this paper: “Being Consistently 
Biocentric.”  
Section one, “Spinozist Determinism,” foregrounds Sharp’s 






scientific understanding of our species being just as causally determined as 
any other species. We maintain that Spinoza’s promotion of animal cruelty 
stems not from an unwitting reversion to pre-modern ontological 
anthropocentrism, as Sharp and others, like Schopenhauer, have suggested, 
but rather from the converse. Ontological biocentrism without an axiological 
biocentrism necessitates the axiological anthropocentrism characteristic of 
Spinoza’s system. The human animal has just as much a right to actualize the 
powers of its nature as do animals of other species, including the power to 
kill or be killed. And it is just as susceptible to affective contagion—a point 
Deleuze and Guattari drive home with their notion of becoming animal—as 
are animals of other species. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, however, 
Spinoza’s real fear is that affective contact with animals of other species will 
lead to societal discord and deter us from what promotes the human 
advantage; reason-overriding affects like hatred or envy are prone to cause 
discord and strife in and amongst members of our own societies. 
The second section, “Anthropocentrism: A Modern Paradox,” 
highlights the modern paradox lurking behind the assumptions of both Sharp 
and Spinoza: if the human is merely one species among many (ontological 
biocentrism), and just as causally determined (Spinozist determinism), we 
are therefore liberated to pursue what is to the increase of our power and our 
pleasure, no matter the cost to the rest of earth’s inhabitants (axiological 
anthropocentrism). This is why ontological paradigms as distinct as those of 
Descartes and Spinoza can both beget the same kind of animal cruelty, 
stemming from the assumption of an axiological anthropocentrism. And this 
is why Spinoza, whose ontological paradigm would seem to call for a check 
upon Cartesian cruelty, no longer conceiving of nonhumans as mere animal-
machines, could be consistently crueler than Descartes. 
Finally, section three, “Axiological Anthropocentrism,” addresses the 
question as to whether an animal “ethic” which appeals to the maximization 
of human pleasure and power, following Spinozist premises, is sufficient to 
meet the demands of our present moment. We argue that the stakes for our 
species and our planet are simply too high to endorse such an animal “ethic,” 
when the maximization of human pleasure and power stands behind so many 








Sharp begins her analysis of Spinoza’s comments about animals by 
contrasting the consistency of her own Spinozist, thoroughgoing 
determinism with the view she believes the majority of contemporary 
philosophers hold, “the Kantian compatibilist view of human freedom.” 
These thinkers affirm, on the one hand, that “our bodies and behaviors are 
determined by an entirely predictable chain of cause and effect” and 
additionally, on the other hand, that “morality requires that we attribute to 
rational beings a free agency that can nowhere be observed except by the 
inward looking eye of reason” (Sharp, 2011, p. 49). Such misguided 
optimism indicates either self-deception or an inability to fully part with 
human hubris. Moral sentimentalism aside, she maintains, we actually know 
that the compatibilist position cannot be true. Modern science has proven as 
much. 
 Sharp indicates that Spinoza’s ontology is fully consistent with the 
determinist conclusions of modern natural science, providing a vision of 
reality much truer to our scientific understanding of the world as a closed 
causal nexus in which all effects are determined by their causes. When 
Spinoza postulates Definitions 3-6 in Part I of the Ethics, successively 
defining Substance as “that which is in itself and is conceived through itself” 
(ID3) and God as “absolutely infinite being, that is, substance consisting of 
infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence” 
(ID6), he is already well on his way to having limited the number of 
substances to only one possible, God (IP5, IP6, IP14), which necessarily 
exists (IP7, IP11). God, of course, is another name for Nature: Deus sive 
Natura. 
 In Spinoza’s ontology these originary determinations concerning 
Substance demote all other beings to the status of modes, or “the affections 
of substance, that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through 
something else” (ID5). While modes are perceived according to the infinite 
attributes of Substance (ID4, IP15), our limitations restrict us to recognizing 
only two of these infinite attributes, thought and extension. 
  Substance alone is a “free,” or efficient cause. Since only one 
substance can exist, “It follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause” 
(IP17Cor2; cf. also IP25). God causes in accordance with his infinite nature, 
as a necessary cause, but is not capable of willing (IP32Cor2; IP17s). Thus, 
things could not be otherwise than the way in which God has produced them, 






determined by God to act in particular ways, which cannot be changed: “A 
thing that has been determined by God cannot determine itself to act” (IP26), 
and can never “render itself undetermined” (IP27). No individual mode can 
exist or act unless another finite cause determines its action (IP28), such that 
“Nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the 
divine nature determined to act in a definite way” (IP29). According to 
Spinoza’s biocentric ontology, in which all finite things retain equal status as 
modes of one infinite Substance, there would be no possibility of quasi-
claims to moral agency: “In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will. The 
mind is determined to this or that volition by a cause, which is likewise 
determined by another cause, and this again by another, and so ad infinitum” 
(IIP48). 
Compatibilism attempts to retain “a vestige of the wishful thinking 
that aims to maintain that humans are, concomitantly, natural beings and 
absolutely distinct in kind from natural things” (Sharp, 2011, p. 49). But in 
the same manner, Sharp argues, Spinoza’s attempts to salvage an essential 
distinction in species—asserted a century prior to Kant and in the wake of 
the original Copernican revolution—are symptomatic of recalcitrant human 
hubris: “This antinomian logic – this view of ourselves a A(nimal) and not-
A(nimal) – is visible even in Spinoza, whose system denies any absolute 
differences between finite existents” (ibid.). Even despite the clear 
consequence that humans and nonhumans are mere modes among modes, 
Spinoza appears to assume a human claim to ontological supremacy. And 
unlike Kant, he exhibits such human hubris despite the fact that he can 
rightfully be deemed, as Yitzhak Melamed puts it, “the most radical anti-
humanist among modern philosophers” (Melamed, 2011, p. 148). 
 If so great an anti-humanist as Spinoza could fail to rid himself of 
anthropocentric tendencies, Sharp ventures, this fact must attest to a profound 
anxiety lurking at the core of each of us, rooted in the recognition that we are 
not really essentially different from animals of other species. She writes, “In 
what follows, I will bring out Spinoza’s contradictory and ambivalent 
remarks pertaining to the specific differences between humans and animals. 
It is my suspicion that this ambivalence continues to plague us today” (Sharp, 
2011, p. 50). For fear of what giving up pride of place might entail, Spinoza 
refuses to give animals of other species the ethical consideration they 
deserve. The bold among us, she insinuates, must push past Spinoza and stare 






 But perhaps the problem is that Spinoza has stared into the abyss. In 
other words, it’s not the case that he looks away from the consequences of 
his biocentric ontology in fear, reverting to an exceptionalism characteristic 
of his tradition. It’s not the case that Spinoza holds himself back from 
assenting to conclusions he should but cannot bring himself to draw. Far from 
hatred of nonhuman animals, love of humanity is what keeps him from 
“humane” consideration of other animals, remaining perfectly consistent 
with species-favoring considerations of animals from other species—wolves 
hunt sheep or other animals and not each other, for instance, and so too with 
humans who hunt animals of other species. Love of kind drives him to affirm 
our right to kill or be killed, absolutely barring contact with nonhumans for 
fear of affective contagion. 
 Sharp’s no-nonsense attitude in expressing the consequences of 
Spinozist determinism embodies and attests to what we can call Spinoza’s 
brute realism, not to be understood in a metaphysical sense, but rather after 
the everyday idiom that designates a characteristically modern commitment 
to assess actions and behaviors as they are, not as they ought to be. A. O. 
Hirschman explains further in his now-classic economic work The Passions 
and the Interests, noting that while Hobbes bases his political analyses upon 
the assessments of human nature which span the first ten chapters of 
Leviathan,  
 
…it was Spinoza who reiterated, with particular sharpness and 
vehemence, Machiavelli’s charges against the utopian thinkers of the 
past, this time in relation to individual human behavior. In the 
opening paragraph of the Tractatus politicus he attacks the 
philosophers who “conceive men not as they are but as they would 
like them to be.” And this distinction between positive and normative 
thinking appears again in the Ethics, where Spinoza opposes to those 
who “prefer to detest and scoff at human affects and actions” his own 
famous project to “consider human actions and appetites just as if I 
were considering lines, planes, or bodies” (Hirschman, 2013, p. 14). 
 
Spinoza the brute realist, in diagnosing the human predicament, recognizes 
dangerous possibilities brought into play when human behavior sinks below 
the level of rationality. He refuses a moral sentimentalism that would 






attempt to force relinquishment of what it can rightfully lay claim to by virtue 
of its power. 
 It’s not the case, therefore, that Spinoza’s view of humanity is too 
high, or too anthropocentric. He does not give the human unique pride of 
place or set him above and apart from other species. Rather, the human 
animal is just as prone to the same sorts of affects as are other animals. By 
analogy, as I’ve often heard it said, the true feminist does not dumb down 
arguments for female students, or grade their exams more leniently. To do so 
would be to exercise a lack of respect for women, to belie an assumed 
superiority that directly contradicts claims to respect. Just as the true feminist 
actually maintains a high degree of consistency in such matters, so too the 
true ontological biocentrist is necessarily an ethical “anthropocentrist,” in the 
sense that she affirms that humanity is merely one species among many, 
boasting an equal right to act in accordance with the powers of its nature. 
 For Spinoza the actions and behaviors of the human animal are just 
as causally determined as those of any other animal, save for the possibility 
of a rational assent that can transform passive and even painful affectations 
into active pleasures of contemplation. But the more we enter into affective 
contact with animals of other species, the more we are diverted from goods 
integral to the powers of our own natures. Thus, Spinoza writes, “Nothing 
can be more in harmony with the nature of anything than individuals of the 
same species, and so there is nothing more advantageous to man for 
preserving his own being and enjoying a rational life than a man who is 
guided by reason” (IVapp9). The danger of affective communion with 
“beasts” is that human individuals are just as susceptible to diversion from 
what best promotes their own advantage as are animals of other species. And 
insofar as painful, passive affects like pity stand in total tension with reason 
as active and pleasurable, suffering the former tends toward the destruction 
of the human’s nature, whereas cultivating the latter tends toward its 
perfection. 
The truth of the matter is, “men are changeable (few there are who 
live under the direction of reason) and yet for the most part envious, and more 
inclined to revenge than to compassion. So it needs an unusually powerful 
spirit to bear with each according to his disposition and to restrain oneself 
from imitating their emotions” (IVapp13). Due to high vulnerability to 
affects like anger, envy, and hatred, and considering the socially detrimental 






one human to reason with and dissuade another human who is under the sway 
of such affects, preventing the destructive acts that usually follow. It’s much 
more likely that the one attempting to dissuade will fall under the same 
affective spell, becoming complicit in the other’s socially destructive acts. 
Note that here in the appendix to part IV of the Ethics (IVapp13), 
summarizing the proofs scattered throughout the main text, Spinoza repeats 
verbatim a phrase used in the Scholium to Proposition 68, regarding the fall 
of the first man from a state of originary perfection. Of Adam he writes, “But 
when he came to believe that the beasts were like himself, he straightway 
began to imitate their emotions and to lose his freedom…” (IVP68s). Human 
“freedom” is possible only according to a correct use of reason, on the basis 
of adequate ideas generated by active states of mind. By contrast, inadequate 
ideas are generated on the basis of passive states of mind (IIIP1, IIIP3). And 
by IIIP27, “From the fact that we imagine a thing like ourselves, toward 
which we have felt no emotion, to be affected by an emotion, we are thereby 
affected by a similar emotion.” Far from passive affectation, especially of 
pain leading to pity, human perfection consists in active reasoning, which 
brings pleasure and so perfects our nature (IIIP53, IIIP54, IVP52, VP15). 
Affinity for beasts, leading toward imitation of their affects, is the very 
source of human “evil” (IVP68s) and must therefore be avoided at all costs. 
In the absence of a biocentric axiology, Spinoza’s axiologically 
anthropocentric “ethical” conclusions concerning animal affect are thus 
perfectly consistent with his ontological biocentrism. The human animal is 
to avoid affective contact with animals of other species, and especially the 
painful emotion of pity. Such a view precludes the possibility of human care 
for nonhuman animals, and of embracing any seemingly “beneficial” affects 
in which we might be tempted to trust. 
 
Anthropocentrism: A Modern Paradox 
 Having argued that the axiologically anthropocentric directives 
concerning nonhuman animals found in Spinoza’s Ethics are consistent with 
his thoroughgoing ontological biocentrism, we move beyond Spinoza to 
argue that in the absence of a biocentric axiology and the presence of an 
ontological biocentrism, any animal ethic will prove axiomatically 
anthropocentric. In this case other modes of being are reduced to having 
merely instrumental value, and are “morally” considerable only in terms of 






with Sharp’s arguments about Spinoza’s causal determinism and its 
coincidence with the modern scientific understanding of human being’s place 
in nature, we highlight a uniquely modern paradox. If “man” is simply one 
species among many (ontological biocentrism) and just as casually 
determined (Spinozist determinism), he is thereby “liberated” to pursue 
pleasure and avoid pain without ethical restraint (axiological 
anthropocentrism), no matter the cost to earth’s other animate inhabitants. 
Hayward parses two senses in which the term anthropocentrism is 
used, and in doing so he draws out a paradox resulting from the modern 
scientific understanding of humanity. Typically the term is used in a manner 
that sets our modern understanding of ourselves and our place in nature in 
contrast with older, ontologically anthropocentric views of the universe. As 
he writes, “This cognitive displacement of human beings from centre stage 
in the greater scheme of things has been made possible, above all, by 
developments in modern science” (Hayward, 1997, p. 50). Concurring with 
Sharp’s denunciation of compatibilist views of human ethical freedom, in 
this sense “anthropocentrism” is typically employed as a byword for an “old-
fashioned” or “obsolete” human hubris that would seek to exempt our species 
from causal laws observed to be at work in the rest of the natural world. 
This modern, ontologically humbled understanding of our species as 
one among many brings about the paradox: “This detached view of humans 
has been made possible by just that kind of objectivating knowledge which 
more recently has been held to lie at the root of an attitude toward the natural 
world to be condemned as anthropocentric” (Hayward, 1997, p. 50). 
Ontological dethronement brings liberation from the ethical restraints of pre-
modern ontological anthropocentrism, for example from the demands of 
piety that led the Church to resist Copernicus and to condemn Galileo, and 
from the subsequent constraints of fear that prevented Descartes from 
publishing The World and compelled Spinoza to publish anonymously. The 
ontological flattening that comes in consort with modern scientific discovery 
frees the human to pursue the goals and aims of modern natural science 
without having to fear deterrents which had plagued previous generations. 
But if ours is merely one species among others, ontological 
considerations will no longer restrict “man” from exerting power in pursuit 
of pleasure, and in flight from pain, in whichever ways he so desires. This 
new ontological understanding invigorates a uniquely modern axiological 






nature: the position Charles Taylor refers to as “exclusive humanism” 
(Taylor 2007). It is on this basis that thinkers with ontological paradigms as 
seemingly distinct as Descartes and Spinoza—one of whom relies upon a real 
distinction between thinking substance and extended substance, and so 
relegates nonhumans to the status of animal-machines, and the other of whom 
would appear to obliterate grounds for any such distinction between humans 
and animals of other species—can hold the same axiological position in 
reference to nonhuman animals. Both Descartes and Spinoza glory in the 
modern supposition that we are absolutely unrestrained with(out) respect to 
animals of other species, paradoxically ‘free’ to enact whichever cruelties we 
so desire upon them, whether for business or for pleasure. ‘Free,’ in other 
words, in “making use of them as we please” (IVP37s1). 
Spinoza’s anthropocentric axiology is perfectly consonant with his 
biocentric ontology, such that there’s no need to try and twist his practical 
“ethic” to make it fit more consistently with the rest of his thought. Richard 
Watson, assuming the absence of an axiological biocentrism, argued this 
point in response to an earlier generation of deep ecologists: “A fully 
egalitarian biocentric ethic would place no more restrictions on the behavior 
of human beings than on the behavior of any other animals” (Watson, 1983, 
p. 245). Insofar as we employ the term ethics to indicate governance of 
human behavior in the direction of goodness, or at least, with Spinoza, in the 
direction of increased pleasure, anything less would fall outside the ethical 
realm. In this sense a Spinozistic, “biocentric ethics”—by which we mean: a 
guide to human action operating on the assumption of ontological 
biocentrism, in accordance with Spinoza’s determinist thesis, and so in the 
absence of axiological biocentrism—would not be properly “ethical” at all. 
Its imperative would have to be something like this: “act in such a way that 
whatever you’re doing is what you’d normally do without further 
consideration, being just as bound by deterministic constraints as any other 
mode of being.” Under these conditions “Spinozist animal ethics” becomes 
an oxymoron. Being consistently biocentric would entail something like what 
Annie Dillard suggests in Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, channeling her anxiety at 
the impossibility of escaping our uniquely human capacity for moral 
reflection: “We are freaks, the world is fine, and let us all go have lobotomies 
to restore us to a natural state. We can leave the library then, go back to the 






reed” (Dillard, 1974, p. 180). And, of course, her next line is telling: “You 
first.” 
As a result of his own more consistent ontological biocentrism, in the 
absence of a biocentric axiology, Watson argues in response to the deep 
ecologists that perhaps “nature” as a whole, the same nature that includes 
humans, is better off undergoing another mass extinction event, to be 
promulgated this time by the self-interested actions of animals that happen to 
belong to the human species. “Human beings do alter things. They cause the 
extinction of many species, and they change the Earth’s ecology. This is what 
humans do. This is their destiny. If they destroy many other species and 
themselves in the process, they do no more than has been done by many other 
species.” Thus again the consistent ontological biocentrist is forced to admit, 
“The human species should be allowed—if any species is said to have a 
right—to live out its evolutionary potential, to its own destruction if that is 
the end result. It is nature’s way” (Watson, 1983, p. 253). 
As David Wood points out, any call to action is first and foremost 
human-focused; critiquing any ethic as “anthropocentric” would be 
misguided (Wood, 2011, p. 32). This has not been our line of approach. The 
fact of the matter is that when we endorse ontological biocentrism and reject 
axiological biocentrism, and especially when we accept Spinoza’s 
determinist thesis, a genuine care or compassion for animals outside of our 
species can be salvaged only if at all by an appealing to the maximization of 
human pleasure and power. Consider Watson’s claim: “But civilized man 
wreaks such havoc on the environment. We disrupt the ecology of the planet, 
cause the extinction of myriad other species of living things, and even alter 
the climate of the Earth. Should we not attempt to curb our behavior to avoid 
these results? Indeed we should as a matter of prudence if we want to 
preserve our habitat and preserve the survival of our species” (Watson, 1983, 
p. 252; my emphasis). He concludes: “But this is anthropocentric thinking.” 




 Spinoza argues that pity for nonhuman animals is more harmful than 
beneficial, due to the human animal’s vulnerability to passive affects that 
hinder its power, rather than promoting it. Sharp attempts to draw the 






Spinoza’s axiological anthropocentrism is perfectly consistent with his 
biocentric ontology, and that such would have to be the case in the absence 
of axiological biocentrism, it remains to evaluate on ethical grounds Sharp’s 
proposal concerning animal affects, in the context of concerns that will, or at 
least should matter deeply to the animal activist. Her view provides a case by 
which to test our thesis that if axiological biocentrism is rejected, a biocentric 
ontology cannot support the normative claims a robust animal ethics—and 
the demands of the present moment—would require. 
We begin by acknowledging that Sharp’s examples of affective 
contact between humans and animals of other species, instances in which 
nonhuman animals appear to assist humans in achieving Spinozist, human-
centered ends, are indeed prima facie persuasive. She cites a few examples 
and then posits an attempt at further justification: 
 
Alzheimer’s patients, for example, show improved memory upon 
friendly interaction  with cats or dogs. Likewise, research reveals a 
‘cardiovascular benefit’ for males with dogs (…). Children who have 
difficulty reading can be helped significantly by a canine audience, 
and mere pet presence improves arithmetic calculations, something 
Spinoza would surely appreciate. Although Spinoza does not offer 
reasons to proscribe human interest in favor of animal flourishing 
(…), his conception of agency as an effect of our  involvement 
with ambient powers should furnish an appreciation of the many 
enabling aspects of the involuntary affective community between 
humans and animals (Sharp, 2011, p. 65). 
 
We note firstly that Sharp earlier eliminated the possibility of “agency” when 
disallowing the possibility of Kantian compatibilism, writing, “morality 
requires that we attribute to rational beings a free agency that can nowhere 
be observed…” (Sharp, 2011, p. 49). Perhaps her reference to Spinoza’s 
“conception of agency as an effect of our involvement with ambient powers” 
is meant to refer to determination by the affects of those within one’s general 
proximity, and her use of the term “agency” here is simply equivocal, 
harboring an implied reference to notions of nonhuman agency as found in 
the works of the new materialists. Nonetheless, as we have understood, 
Spinoza staunchly opposes “involuntary affective community between 






Perhaps Sharp’s defense of the “useful” effects of contact with 
nonhumans animals could be accommodated on the basis of a qualified 
statement Spinoza makes concerning good and evil in the appendix to Part 
IV of the Ethics. He begins, “Whatsoever in nature we deem evil, that is, 
capable of hindering us from being able to exist and to enjoy a rational life, 
it is permissible for us to remove in whatever seems the safer way” (IVapp8). 
What if, contra-Spinoza and in support of Sharp’s position, we refused to 
deem contact with nonhuman animals to be evil in the way Spinoza 
maintains? In this case we would seem to have no reason to “remove” 
nonhumans from among us. Purporting to locate Spinoza’s anxiety when 
faced with collapsing species boundaries, Sharp argues in favor of this type 
of circumnavigation. In making this proposal she claims to be reading 
Spinoza against himself. 
Spinoza continues, “On the other hand, whatever we deem good, that 
is, advantageous for preserving our being and for enjoying a rational life, it 
is permissible for us to take for our use and to use it as we please. And as an 
absolute rule, it is permissible by the highest natural right for everyone to do 
what he judges to be to his own advantage” (IVapp8, emphasis mine). His 
phrasing here in the appendix reproduces the exact phrasing from the body 
of part IV, where he encourages the same “usage” with(out) respect in 
particular to nonhuman animals, namely our right of “making use of them as 
we please” (IVP37s1). Sharp does not deny his claim about an absolute 
human right to usage, but instead seeks to satisfy its criterion by affirming 
that affective contact can be conceived as one example of increasing human 
pleasure and intensifying human power. 
But we must be careful to recognize what would be conceded if we 
were to agree to these premises, in the context of pressing environmental 
problems that stem from abuses against animals.  Spinoza’s stipulation, his 
license to kill in whatever manner and to whichever scale we deem 
appropriate, would not only condone killing for nourishment, or for 
recreation. It would also justify much less licit practices like large-scale 
slaughter, as in factory farming, or even malicious animal testing—so long 
as torture is carried out for the sake of increasing human pleasure or power 
and decreasing human pain or impotency. Sharp admits as much when 
introducing her examples of contact, which aim to promote human benefit: 
“We are rendered powerful not just by instrumentalizing them as food or test 






companionship” (Sharp, 2011, p. 64, emphasis mine). Even if we allow that 
one-on-one contact with nonhuman animals might serve to increase human 
pleasure or power, still we have to ask: what ethical basis is there, on 
Spinoza’s view, for combatting large-scale injustices like factory farming? 
Or even for restraining oneself from buying products that support this and 
other heinously inhumane practices toward nonhuman animals, let alone our 
shared environments? Is there a basis for abstinence from unnecessary 
consumption of meat, consumed for the purpose of an unnecessary increase 
of human pleasure, despite the heedless increase of animal suffering? 
A consistent ontological biocentrism, in the absence of axiological 
biocentrism and the presence of Spinozist determinism, must allow that 
humans simply do whatever we do best. We’ve become highly skilled in 
effecting many types of human-to-nonhuman domination, 
instrumentalization, and, it appears, world-destruction. Such a reduction of 
“ethics” to the maximization of human power and pleasure comes at an 
extremely high price, especially at a cultural moment when the stakes have 
grown so high. 
One such example of heightened stakes is taking place in the 
Amazon, where large swaths of rainforest are clear-cut daily to make room 
for land upon which to graze cattle (see for example Lovejoy & Nobre, 2018). 
Such practices simultaneously deplete a primary source of oxygen, eliminate 
one of earth’s most essential carbon sinks, and increase the emission of 
carbon by adding an increase of cattle where foliage, once part of a 
flourishing local ecosystem, previously stood. And all this not for the sake of 
feeding starving human populations (a laudable goal for which a more 
sustainable, vegetable-based diet would be necessary), but for the sake of 
economic gain, to increase the power and pleasure of human consumers. 
At one point Sharp contrasts Hobbes’s view of the human animal with 
Spinoza’s, arguing that Spinoza’s view is unquestionably more optimistic 
about the possibility of human goodness with respect to intra-species 
relations. She writes, “Spinoza invokes the adage ‘man is a God to man’ to 
rebut Hobbes’s suggestion that humans have an irreducible lupine tendency 
that political organization must suppress, precariously and constantly. For 
Hobbes, one must not forget that ‘man is a wolf to man,’ even if the sword 
can maintain godly relations among citizens” (Sharp, 2011, p. 63). On the 






motivates self-negation, or bald-faced denial of what we are, for fear of 
becoming animal. 
She then argues that Spinoza likely has Hobbes in mind, writing, “the 
perpetual fear of our fellow man as predator bars the discovery of those who 
might be standing beside us, in perfect agreement with our natures” (Sharp, 
2011, p. 63). In other words, fear or anxiety in the face of our own 
animality—fear or anxiety which, she seeks to establish, is principal cause of 
Spinoza’s wrongheaded, anti-animal, human-centered ethics—may be 
holding us back from “discovering” affective contact with the nonhumans 
already dwelling beside us. And such contact may turn out to be more than 
simply predatorial, she suggests. It might also, possibly, be beneficial for us. 
Whereas Sharp sets Spinoza’s dictum “man is a wolf to man” against 
Hobbes’s “man is a God to man,” we recognize that the two statements are 
not incompatible. Sharp argues in response to Hobbes that wolves don’t fight 
wolves, instead sticking together in a pack. Yet it should be clear that 
Hobbes’s maxim, drawn from Plautus, isn’t intended to evoke an image of 
wolves fighting wolves, as Sharp maintains. Rather, it evokes the image of 
wolves together preying upon sheep, a flock of weaker animals among whom 
they stalk, unnoticed. Weaker men are like sheep subjugated to the perverse 
power of the strong; such disharmony would pit individuals of the same 
species against one another and so set their “natures,” and what follows to 
the advantage of each, in insurmountable opposition. Spinoza simply 
maintains that Hobbesian “wolves” succumb to the affects of beasts when 
neglecting to seek their true advantage, in accordance with reason. 
These wolves sink below human “natures” in pursuit of lesser ends, 
which would presumably provide satisfaction only to beasts, or lesser 
animals. Such are, Spinoza implies, the pleasure and power that accrue 
through acts of domination. Man’s becoming wolf to man, preying upon the 
weak, would be to seek his own advantage over and against the advantage of 
others of the same species. And Spinoza strongly objects to such a 
conception. But he also objects to a Hobbesian conception of the state that 
would coerce man to be a god to man through fear (cf. IVapp16). Instead and 
in response he posits that “man is a God to man” by right use of reason. 
An originary “fall” from a state of perfection was induced when the 
first man subverted the demands of his rational nature and began to imitate 
the affects of beasts (IVP68s). One key proposition that helps us understand 






Ethics: “From the fact that we imagine a thing like ourselves, toward which 
we have felt no emotion, to be affected by an emotion, we are thereby 
affected by a similar emotion” (IIIP27). Note the phraseology used after the 
proof, when he explicates in the Scholium, “This imitation of emotions, when 
it is related to pain, is called Pity, but when it is related to desire it is called 
Emulation, which is therefore ‘nothing else but the desire of some thing 
which has been engendered in us from the belief that others similar to 
ourselves have this same desire’” (IIIP27s). Pity is a passive emotion of pain 
(IVP50) that destroys rather than perfecting our nature (IIIP11s). And for 
Spinoza pity is the sole emotion that would lead us to consider extending care 
or concern to animals of other species. This is precisely what he condemns 
when chiding “womanish compassion” for animals (IVP37s1; cf. also 
IIIP22s). 
Spinoza has no conception of nature promulgating evil. This is a 
direct consequence of his thoroughgoing ontological biocentrism, coupled 
with his determinist thesis. Nature is—and, in fact, is perfect (IP33s2)—and 
so who are we to challenge its preeminence? What right have mere modes to 
challenge their maker? He claims explicitly that if God has decreed that it be 
so, reason will not challenge it. In the Scholium to IVP50 he writes, “He who 
rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature 
and happen in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of Nature will 
surely find nothing deserving of hatred, derision, or contempt [and] nor will 
he pity anyone” (IVP50s, cf. IP33). This note follows the Corollary: “Hence 
it follows that the man who lives by the dictates of reason endeavors, as far 
as he can, not to be touched by pity” (IVP50cor, my emphasis). Pity, or 
passive affectation of pain on behalf of another in pain, directly contrasts 
with our highest good, namely active reasoning in accordance with our 
nature. 
Sean McGrath has recently responded to the posthumanist tendencies 
of environmentalists inspired by Spinoza, especially through the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari, “Naturalism without humanism produces a flattened 
ontology in which nothing is particularly good or evil.” He continues, 
 
We ought to recall that Spinoza’s argument for why we should treat 
others well is that it  is better to be surrounded by friends rather than 
enemies—i.e., the utilitarian calculus. When we recall that utilitarian 






reduced to exchange-value (in Marx’s language)—the conundrum 
facing political ecology becomes clear: naturalism without humanism 
leaves us with nothing but the ethics of capitalism (McGrath, 2018, 
p. 102). 
 
Especially in light of pressing practical consequences, considering the 
contemporary effects of the modern quest to conquer nature and to put its 
resources to work “for our pleasure,” the question as to whether Spinoza’s 
ontology is sufficient to ground care and compassion for animals, and more 
generally environmental concern, is paramount now more than ever. Even if 
she operates on the basis of laudable desires to temper Spinoza’s antipathy 
toward nonhuman animals, and to incorporate animal affects in a more 




Sharp’s “ethical” proposal is not properly ethical at all, at least not in 
any substantive sense. It is perhaps more aptly characterized as an animal 
aesthetics. And this conception is perfectly in line, as far as we can tell, with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Spinoza-inspired conception of becoming animal, 
which others have taken up in similar attempts to encourage ethical 
responsibility toward nonhuman animals from within a generally Spinozist 
framework. But by now it has become clear that Spinoza’s precise point in 
condemning interactions with animals is to warn us against just such a notion, 
on the basis that the majority of humans are indeed likely to “become 
animals” based on affective contact—and with consequences that extend not 
just to those outside the species, in line with Spinoza’s fear. This is precisely 
what Hobbes’s dictum suggests, and what Spinoza tries to prevent by 
promoting the right use of reason. For Spinoza, imitating the affects of beasts 
leads to every manner of “evil.” Recalling Watson’s arguments about what a 
consistently biocentric ethics—in the presence of Spinozist determinism, and 
absence of a biocentric axiology—would entail, it appears that endorsing 
Spinoza’s biocentric ontology opens irrevocably a Pandora’s box of evils. 
Axiological anthropocentrism versus axiological biocentrism: why 
should we care? With Katie McShane with can now affirm that the question 
is relevant because our ethical attitudes are relevant (McShane, 2007). 






excessively, that end valuable lives prematurely, and that tend toward the 
destruction of all the living, are relevant. We should care because the 
problems we have pinpointed produce a lack of care for those nonhumans 
whose suffering is compounded by an anthropocentric axiology. In light of 
mass injustices promulgated by our species against earth’s nonhuman 
inhabitants, in consort with the assumption of a modern, paradoxically 
anthropocentric axiology, such attempts to salvage a weak semblance of 
sympathy for animals from within a Spinozist framework prove inadequate 
to address environmental crises fueled in part by, and in consort with abuses 
in animal ethics, for example in modern industrial animal agriculture. We 
must care, because in ignoring the question we’re left with the “business-as-
usual” scenario, with nonhuman animals still conceived as mere material to 
be manipulated for human ends. Even despite Spinoza’s ontological rejoinder 
to Descartes, the animals continue to be practically conceived as mere 
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